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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason A Hotchkiss appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and executing, without reduction, the sentences imposed upon his 
convictions for two counts of grand theft. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In August 2007, Hotchkiss stole Kenneth Molleson's wallet and thereafter 
used Mr. Molleson's financial transaction card to make three separate retail 
purchases, totaling approximately $300.00. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 8/14/07 Incident 
Report of Officer S. Ramirez, attached to 3/12/08 PSI; 8/15/07 Supp. Report of 
Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.) Hotchkiss also attempted to use 
Mr. Molleson's bank account number to make an online payment of $1700.00 
toward Hotchkiss' motorcycle loan. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 8/24/07 Supp. Report of 
Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.) 
Over the next two months, Hotchkiss stole checks from the mailboxes of 
numerous individuals, including Melvin Fouke and Samuel Jun. (R., pp.17-18; 
3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 10/11/07 Incident Report of Officer S. Winnings, attached to 
3/12/08 PSI; 11/16/07 Supp. Report of Officer J. Rhodes, attached to 3/12/08 
PSI.) After taking the check from Mr. Jun's mailbox, Hotchkiss made the check 
payable to himself in the amount of $5300.00, forged Mr. Jun's signature and 
attempted to deposit the check in his girlfriend's bank account. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 
10/11/07 Incident Report of Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.) 
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The state charged Hotchkiss with five counts of grand theft. (R., pp.16-
18.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hotchkiss pied guilty to the two counts in 
which Mr. Molleson and Mr. Jun were victims, and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges. (R., pp.16-21.) The district court imposed consecutive 
unified sentences of 10 years with four years fixed on the first count, and 10 
years with five years fixed on the second count, and retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.37-38, 40-44.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
suspended the balance of Hotchkiss' sentences and placed him on probation for 
10 years. (R., pp.58-73.) The order placing Hotchkiss on probation was entered 
on June 1, 2009. (R., p.65.) 
On June 29, 2011, Hotchkiss' probation officer submitted a report of 
violation alleging that Hotchkiss had "not done well while on probation" and had 
committed numerous violations, beginning as early as April 2010. (R., pp.96-
100.) Specifically, the report of violation alleged that Hotchkiss had violated his 
probation by incurring two new misdemeanor DWP convictions; failing to 
maintain employment and repeatedly failing to attend a workforce readiness 
class as instructed by his probation officer; failing to report for supervision on two 
separate occasions; being discharged from two separate treatment programs 
due to non-compliance and unexcused absences; and failing to make payments 
toward his court costs, fines and restitution. (Id.; see also R., pp.74-78 (Motion 
For Warrant For Probation Violation).) Hotchkiss admitted the majority of the 
allegations (R., p.145; 10/18/11 Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.11, L.7), and the district court 
revoked his probation and ordered his underlying sentences executed (R., 
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Hotchkiss states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hotchkiss due 
process and equal protection when it denied his motion to 
augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Hotchkiss' probation and failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte 
upon revoking probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Hotchkiss failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated 
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Hotchkiss failed to establish the district court abused its discretion 
either by revoking probation or by not sua sponte reducing his sentence 




Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motions To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Hotchkiss filed motions to augment 
with four unprepared transcripts. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule and Statement In Support Thereof, filed August 10, 2012 
("Motion").) The requested transcripts included (1) the February 4, 2008 change 
of plea hearing; (2) the November 3, 2008 sentencing hearing; (3) the June 1, 
2009 rider review hearing; and (4) the October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing. 
(Motion, pp.1-2). The state objected to the preparation and inclusion in the 
appellate record of all but the October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing. (Objection 
In Part To "Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And 
Statement In Support Thereof," filed August 15, 2012.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court granted Hotchkiss' request to augment the record with a transcript of the 
October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing, but denied Hotchkiss' request for the 
remaining transcripts. (Order, dated August 28, 2012.) 
Two months later, Hotchkiss filed a Renewed Motion To Augment And 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof ("Renewed 
Motion"), again seeking to augment the appellate record with a transcript of the 
November 3, 2008 sentencing hearing. (Renewed Motion, filed October 26, 
2012, pp.1-3.) The state objected to Hotchkiss' Renewed Motion, and the Idaho 
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Supreme Court adhered to its original decision denying Hotchkiss' motion to 
augment the record with additional transcripts. (Objection To "Renewed Motion 
To Augment And Suspend the Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support 
Thereof," filed October 29, 2012; Order Denying Renewed Motion To Augment 
And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule, dated November 9, 2012.) 
Hotchkiss now contends that, by denying his motions to augment the 
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-
16.) Hotchkiss has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights 
because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant 
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court 
has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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C. Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss 
Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Orders Denying His Motions To Augment 
In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837-39 (Ct. App. 
2012) (review denied Nov. 29, 2012), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a 
claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant his constitutional rights 
by denying his motion to augment the record on appeal with various transcripts. 
In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse 
an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of 
the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court 
decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other law." lit at 
_, 288 P.3d at 837. Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be 
tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court." lit The 
Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a] 
renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or 
respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such 
a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where 
new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." lit 
To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss' 
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho 
Supreme Court's orders denying his motions to augment the record with 
additional transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled on Hotchkiss' Renewed Motion and 
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Hotchkiss has not "refined, clarified or expanded [the] issues on appeal in such a 
way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts," nor has he 
presented new evidence to support renewing his motion to augment yet again. 
Instead, assuming the case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss is 
merely asking the Court to re-evaluate the relevancy arguments that were 
already presented to and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Compare 
Appellant's brief, pp.12-13 with Motion, pp.1-3 and Renewed Motion, p.2.) As 
stated in Morgan, the Court of Appeals has no authority to do so. 
D. If This Court Considers The Merits Of Hotchkiss' Constitutional Claims, He 
Has Failed To Establish Any Of His Rights Have Been Violated 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Hotchkiss' constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. As in Morgan, Hotchkiss argues that he is 
entitled to the additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide 
them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, 
and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-16.) 
All of Hotchkiss' arguments lack merit. 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms 
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also 
Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 838. The state, however, "will not be 
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required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be 
germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent appellant has right to "a 
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transcript of relevant trial proceedings"). Rather, an indigent defendant is 
entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and portions of the record 
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 
U.S. 477. "[T]he State must afford [the indigent appellant] a record complete 
enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 
121. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show 
that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. 
See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) 
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also 
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). 
Hotchkiss' appeal is timely only from the district court's December 18, 
2011 order revoking probation and executing his underlying sentences and, as 
such, that is the only order over which this Court has appellate jurisdiction. 
(Compare I.AR. 14(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of order 
challenged on appeal) with R., pp.146 and 153 (notice of appeal filed 36 days 
after entry of order revoking probation).) The transcripts of the proceedings 
related to that revocation decision, as well as the written materials relied on by 
the district court in deciding to revoke Hotchkiss' probation, are all included in the 
record on appeal. (See generally 10/18/11 Tr. ( evidentiary hearing); 12/19/11 Tr. 
(disposition hearing); R., pp.74-74-136 (7/5/11 Motion For Warrant For Probation 
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Violation and attachments thereto); Exhibits (including 3/12/08 PSI prepared for 
sentencing; 4/3/09 APSI prepared for rider review hearing; 12/13/11 PSI 
prepared for probation violation disposition).) Transcripts of the guilty plea, 
sentencing, and rider review hearings are unnecessary because this Court lacks 
appellate jurisdiction to review the orders that issued from those respective 
hearings. More importantly, transcripts of those hearings were not prepared and 
were not presented to the district court in relation to the probation violation 
proceedings at issue in this case, and there is no indication that what was said at 
those hearings played any role in the order challenged on appeal. The 
transcripts are simply unnecessary for appellate review of the only order within 
the scope of this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
Hotchkiss argues otherwise, contending the requested transcripts are 
necessary to ascertain precisely what he, the attorneys and the trial court said on 
the record at the February 2008 guilty plea hearing, the November 2008 
sentencing hearing and the June 2009 rider review hearing. (Appellant's brief, 
p.12.) Specifically, with respect to the sentencing hearing, Hotchkiss argues that 
a transcript of that hearing is necessary because, inter alia, "it included 
corrections to the PSI, ... the contents of which" Hotchkiss claims are "unknown." 
(Id.) This claim is specious. The PSI prepared for sentencing is included in the 
appellate record and the corrections thereto, initialed by the trial court, appear on 
the face of the document. (See 3/12/08 PSI, pp.2, 10.) Preparation of a 
transcript of the sentencing hearing to ascertain what is already apparent from 
the existing appellate record would result in an unnecessary waste of public 
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funds. Likewise, preparation of a transcript of the rider review hearing to 
determine what additional programs trial counsel represented Hotchkiss 
completed after the APSI was prepared (see Appellant's brief, p.12) would be a 
waste of resources because there is no indication that the district court, 
adjudicating Hotchkiss' probation violations two and a half years later, relied on 
anything other than the written record and exhibits, including all of Hotchkiss' 
"PSls and ... prior PSls" (12/19/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-13), in deciding Hotchkiss was 
no longer amenable to community supervision. 
Hotchkiss' argument is necessarily that some argument or statement 
made at guilty plea, sentencing and rider review hearings in 2008 and 2009 was 
so influential at the probation revocation proceedings held in 2011 that transcripts 
of the earlier proceedings are necessary to review for an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. This argument is beyond speculative. In fact, it is entirely 
unsupportable because the record shows that the judge who presided over 
Hotchkiss' probation violation proceedings in is not the same judge who, in the 
earlier proceedings, took Hotchkiss' guilty plea, sentenced him and placed him 
on probation following the period of retained jurisdiction. (Compare R., pp.19-21, 
37-38, 58-64 (Judge Wetherell presiding over change of plea, sentencing and 
rider review hearings) with R., pp.143-52 (Judge Wood presiding over probation 
violation proceedings)). The current record includes all of the information that 
was actually before the district court in deciding whether to revoke Hotchkiss' 
probation and is more than adequate for appellate review of Hotchkiss' claims 
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that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and ordering his 
sentences executed without reduction. 
Relying in part on State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 
2009), Hotchkiss next asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant and 
necessary for resolution of his appellate claims "because Idaho appellate courts 
review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court 
appropriately revoked probation." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) He also argues that, 
without the requested transcripts, the record will be incomplete and his claims will 
not be reviewed on the merits. (Id., pp.12-13.) Both of these claims lack merit. 
In Hanington, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that, in reviewing a 
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, the Court 
"will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 
judgment" and review is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the 
revocation of probation." 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Contrary to Hotchkiss' 
assertions, this language from Hanington does not require augmentation with 
transcripts of all hearings from sentencing to the final revocation, nor does it 
place upon the defendant-appellant a burden of including in the appellate record 
transcripts never presented to or considered by the district court. As explained 
by the Court of Appeals in Morgan, supra, such an interpretation of Hanington is 
too broad. 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 838. The Court clarified that although 
it "will not arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing 
to the time of the revocation of probation . . . that does not mean that a// 
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proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane." ~ 
(emphasis original). Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying 
the trial court's decision to revoke probation." liL Accordingly, the Court "will 
consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the 
revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on 
appeal." ~ Because all relevant information is already included in the record 
on appeal, Hotchkiss has failed to show any due process violation resulting from 
the Idaho Supreme Court's orders denying his requests for augmentation. 
Hotchkiss' equal protection argument also lacks merit. The Court in 
Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of 
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hotchkiss' equal protection claim 
fails for the same reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hotchkiss, 
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like Morgan, "has failed to demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not 
possible without the requested transcripts." lg_,_ 
Hotchkiss has failed to demonstrate that the requested transcripts are 
necessary to pursue his appellate claims that the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking probation and executing his underlying sentences. 
Hotchkiss' speculative claims that he cannot have a fair review of the merits 
without the transcripts do not establish a violation of his constitutional rights to 
due process, equal protection, or effective assistance of counsel. 
11. 
Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A Introduction 
Hotchkiss argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
probation and ordering his sentences executed without reduction, "[i]n light of the 
mitigating circumstances, including his continued sobriety, acceptance of 
responsibility, and the fact that he committed no new felonies while on 
probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The record supports the court's sentencing 
decisions; Hotchkiss has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty. 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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C. Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
In Revoking His Probation And Ordering His Sentences Executed Without 
Reduction 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards 
governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 
P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the 
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 
P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine 
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment," 
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 
148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8. 
Thirty-five-year-old Hotchkiss has an extensive criminal record, consisting 
primarily of theft-related and driving offenses. (See 3/12/08 PSI, pp.1, 3-9; 
12/13/11 PSI, p.5.) Before he was sentenced for the grand theft charges to 
which he pied guilty in this case, he had previously been convicted of four prior 
felonies - vehicle theft I, forgery II, theft Ill, and insufficient funds check-fraud -
and at least 25 misdemeanor offenses, including attempted theft, driving without 
a valid operator's license (multiple convictions), DWP (multiple convictions), 
reckless driving, DUI, open container, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
unlawful conveyance of articles into/out of jail. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.3-9; 12/13/11 
PSI, pp.5-6.) He appears to have victimized strangers, acquaintances, friends, 
employers and, perhaps most significantly, family. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.2, 10-14, 16-
18.) Although they declined to press charges, Hotchkiss' parents discovered 
shortly before Hotchkiss was sentenced in this case that Hotchkiss had racked 
up approximately $44,000.00 in credit card debt using credit cards he had 
fraudulently obtained in their names. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.10-11, 16-17.) 
Reflecting on Hotchkiss' criminal history, the presentence investigator 
noted in preparation for sentencing that prior legal sanctions and treatment 
16 
opportunities had neither deterred Hotchkiss from committing more crimes nor 
protected society from Hotchkiss' unyielding propensity to "steal[] things that he 
wants, but does not wish to work for." (3/12/08 PSI, p.17.) The investigator 
explained: 
Jason Hotchkiss has been a menace to every community he 
has resided in. He began stealing as a juvenile and continued into 
adulthood. He was sent to treatment centers, youth programs, 
adult programs, has been in and out of jail countless times, been 
placed on juvenile, misdemeanor and felony probation only to 
violate the terms of his probation and have to be brought back in 
front of the judge repeatedly. There has been little to no change at 
all in Mr. Hotchkiss's criminal behavior .... [l]t would appear that Mr. 
Hotchkiss has been out of control for many years and nothing has 
seemed to cause a change. 
(3/12/08 PSI, p.17.) 
Despite the presentence investigator's observation that Hotchkiss had 
"proven time and time again that he is unwilling to abide by probation 
requirements" (3/12/08 PSI, p.18), the district court retained jurisdiction, thereby 
affording Hotchkiss yet another opportunity to prove himself amenable to 
community supervision (R., pp.37-38, 40-44). Although Hotchkiss did well in the 
structured rider program and successfully completed all of his assigned 
programming (see generally 4/2/09 APSI), the success was short-lived. Within 
months after being placed on probation following the completion of his rider in 
June 2009, Hotchkiss began "break[ing] the rules of his probation." (12/13/11 
PSI, p.1 0; see also R., pp.96-100 (report of violation).) He failed to pay his court 
costs, fines and restitution; was terminated from his job "for negligence" and 
thereafter failed to work full-time or comply with his probation officer's repeated 
instructions to attend workforce readiness and job classes; twice failed to report 
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to his supervising officer as instructed; and was convicted of two new 
misdemeanor DWP offenses. (R., pp.74-78, 96-99.) Hotchkiss' probation officer 
attempted to work with Hotchkiss "in spite of his continued non-compliance" 
(12/13/11 PSI, p.10), noting in the "Intermediate Interventions [and] Sanctions" 
section of her report that Hotchkiss "had the benefit of a Retained Jurisdiction, 
New Directions Aftercare, Moral Reconation Therapy, 3 times, increased face to 
face meetings and a strict curfew of work, job search or treatment, otherwise he 
is at home" (R., p.99). Notwithstanding these interventions and rehabilitative 
opportunities, Hotchkiss did not do well on probation and his "probation officer 
had no choice but to go forward with a Probation Violation" after Hotchkiss was 
convicted of the two new DWP offenses. (12/13/11 PSI, p.10.) 
In deciding to revoke Hotchkiss' probation, the district court found that 
Hotchkiss' violations were both "violations of substance" and willful. (12/19/11 
Tr., p.15, Ls.10-17.) The court also specifically recognized that its decision must 
be guided by whether Hotchkiss' probation was "serving the goal of 
rehabilitation." (12/19/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.17-20.) The court considered Hotchkiss' 
expressions of remorse and his explanations for having violated the conditions of 
his probation but found them unpersuasive, noting that Hotchkiss had offered "a 
myriad of excuses" but demonstrated little to no actual compliance with several 
fundamental conditions of his probation, including that he commit no new criminal 
offenses. (12/19/11 Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.24.) Having concluded that 
Hotchkiss' probation was not achieving the goal of rehabilitation, and noting that 
the sheer volume of Hotchkiss' "PSls" and "prior PSls" also "demonstrate[d] a 
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lack of effort to rehabilitate," the district court revoked Hotchkiss' probation and 
ordered his underlying sentences executed without reduction. (12/19/11 Tr., 
p.16, L.25-p.17, L.17.) 
Hotchkiss argues that the district court should have continued him on 
probation or, alternatively, should have reduced his underlying sentences 
because he was able to remain sober while on probation, purported to accept 
responsibility both for his underlying offenses and for his probation violations and 
committed no new felony offenses while being supervised .in the community. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-19.) None of the "mitigating" factors Hotchkiss cites 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. While it is laudable that Hotchkiss appears 
to have remained sober while on probation, his newfound sobriety did not deter 
him from committing two new DWP offenses and otherwise failing to take 
seriously other, equally important conditions of his probation, including that he 
maintain employment, make restitution to his many victims, and make himself 
available for supervision. Likewise, while Hotchkiss claims to have accepted 
responsibility for his criminal conduct and probation violations, the district court 
found otherwise, concluding that Hotchkiss merely offered "excuses" and 
demonstrated no real compliance or rehabilitative progress during his period of 
probation. (12/19/11 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.13.) Finally, the fact that Hotchkiss 
"was not accused of committing any new felony offenses" while on probation 
(Appellant's brief, p.19 (emphasis original)) is hardly significant; the 
misdemeanor DWPs of which Hotchkiss was convicted while on probation 
appear to be his ninth and tenth DWP convictions in a 10-year period. (See 
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3/12/08 PSI, pp.4-9.) That Hotchkiss twice chose to drive with a suspended 
license while on probation and after having faced prior legal sanctions for 
repeatedly engaging in the same conduct shows without a doubt, and regardless 
of how the DWPs were ultimately charged, that Hotchkiss has no respect for the 
law. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
determined Hotchkiss was no longer a viable candidate for community 
supervision. Hotchkiss' history and character, together with his demonstrated 
inability or unwillingness to comply with the law and the terms of his probation did 
not entitled him to reinstatement on probation or to a sua sponte reduction of his 
underlying sentences. Hotchkiss has failed to establish that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Hotchkiss' probation and executing his sentences without 
reduction. 
DATED this 8th day of February, 2013. 
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